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Human Security and International Law: The Potential Scope for Legal 







Human security is a human or people-centred and multi-sectoral 
approach to security, emphasising the empowerment of people to enhance 
their potential through concerted efforts to develop norms, processes and 
institutions that systematically address insecurities. Although the idea 
itself arguably precedes the formation of the Westphalian system, it was 
the UN Development Programme that captured it into policy discourse in 
1994. Since then, the idea has facilitated, for example, the adoption of new 
treaties concerning the protection of civilians during and in the aftermath 
of armed violence, and has informed debates as to how certain rules of 
international law should be interpreted or applied. After locating human 
security within the analytical framework of security, this paper considers 
legal or structural obstacles to the notion of human security being 
harnessed more widely across all fields of international law. This chapter 
finds that the notion of human security challenges international law not 
only in respect of its sovereignty-based legal framework but more 
significantly in relation to the very notion of security shared by policy-





Human security is a human or people-centred and multi-sectoral approach to security, 
which means the protection of people from critical and pervasive threats and 
situations, and the empowerment of people to develop their potential, through 
concerted efforts to develop norms, processes and institutions that systematically 
address insecurities.1 Even though the idea of human security, at its core, arguably 
precedes the formation of the Westphalian system,2  it was the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) that captured it into policy discourse in its 1994 Human 
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Development Report.3 Human security has since then been incorporated into key UN 
policy documents such as the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration,4 the 2004 Report of 
the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel,5 the 2005 In Larger Freedom Report,6 
and the UN Secretary-General’s Report on Human Security in 2010 and 2012.7 World 
leaders affirmed in the 2005 World Summit Outcome the notion of human security as 
encompassing ‘the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty 
and despair’,8 and since then have continued to debate the notion of human security in 
the UN General Assembly.9 
 
The policy debate concerning security has consequently moved beyond traditional 
state-centric security paradigms.10 There is no doubt that the notion of human security 
has paved the way for a shift in focus, away from the domain of national security and 
towards a broader spectrum, which assists us in defining new security concerns or 
redefining the terms of the debate surrounding traditional security threats.11 Within 
the field of international law the idea has facilitated, for example, the adoption of new 
treaties concerning the protection of civilians during and in the aftermath of armed 
violence and has also informed debates as to how certain rules of international law 
should be interpreted or applied. Yet, the actual impacts of human security for the 
development of international law have so far been limited to a few specific areas such 
as arms control, forced displacement and humanitarian intervention. 
 
This chapter considers legal or structural obstacles to the notion of human security 
being harnessed more widely across all fields of international law. It does not intend 
to provide a comprehensive analysis of how the idea of human security has influenced 
the development of international law, as earlier studies have already examined this 
matter in many different respects.12 Rather, this chapter examines the potential of 
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human security in the areas where it has not influenced the development of 
international law. To that end, after locating the notion of human security within the 
analytical framework of security in general (Section 2), this chapter examines the 
extent to which the notion of human security has or has not informed the development 
of international law in each of three different dimensions comprising the analytical 
framework of security, namely: (1) the focus (referent object) of security; (2) the 
scope of security issues; and (3) the means by which security threats are addressed. 
 
2. Locating Human Security within the Analytical Framework of Security 
 
When the world leaders agreed upon adopting the notion of human security in the 
2005 World Summit Outcome, the definitional issue was expressly left for subsequent 
discussion. 13  Subsequently, UN member states discussed human security in the 
General Assembly on 22 May 2008, in which different perspectives were presented 
and weighed the potential benefits of broadening human security against the risks it 
might pose. While some states highlighted the risk of draining human security of any 
real operational value and applicability, other states underlined the risk of limiting the 
concept too narrowly, referring to the benefit of improving the living conditions of 
those most in need.14  
 
Following the thematic debate, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon was tasked 
with seeking the views of UN member states on the notion and definition of human 
security.15 In his 2012 report, however, the Secretary-General chose to set out the core 
values, scope, approach and common understanding of human security, rather than 
define it with specific and clear terms.16 While some states have lamented the lack of 
a clear definition, 17  this approach appears overall to have been well received. 18 
Switzerland, in particular, supported the approach arguing that a precise scientific or 
legal definition ‘would ultimately limit its intrinsic usefulness’.19  
 
The definitional debate of human security comes down to how we understand 
‘security’ as much as what we mean by ‘human’. Security is an elastic and dynamic 
concept susceptible to change resulting from both objective conditions and the 
subjective perception of threats.20 It is often described as ‘an essentially contested 
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concept’,21 due to the fact that it can be understood differently; depending on its 
objects, the perception of threats, the protected values, and the means through which 
these values can be protected. 22  Likewise, human security is not a coherent or 
objective concept that can be defined with a definite and precise meaning, but rather 
forms part of an evolving conception of security that reflects the impacts of different 
values and norms on international relations.23 There can be no single meaning or 
definition of human security. Indeed, different states, policy makers and scholars have 
envisaged different ranges of human security issues.24 Nevertheless, the analytical 
framework of security in general can provide a conceptual way of understanding the 
debates concerning the current state and role of human security in the development of 
international law.25 
 
In the discourse of security studies, human security is, first and foremost, understood 
as a shift in ‘referent objects’ of security from sovereign states or the international 
community to human beings. 26  Ambiguity remains as to whether it is particular 
individual persons or human beings as a collective mass that constitute the referent 
object in the discourse of human security. Peter Hough, for example, understands 
human security as the ‘deepening’ of security, placing individual persons at the centre 
of security analysis and policy-making.27  Barry Buzan, on the other hand, warns 
against the ‘reductionism’ caused by human security in international security thinking, 
emphasising the collectivity of security enterprises as an essential element of referent 
objects.28 This issue informs the debate, as will be discussed below, regarding the 
extent to which human security overlaps with or distinguishes itself from human 
rights. 
 
Second, not only does human security shift the focus of referent objects to human 
beings, it also entails a broadened, multi-sectoral understanding of security and 
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addresses a wider range of causes of insecurity as part of security policy agendas.29 
Furthermore, various human security threats are mutually reinforcing and 
interconnected because of their causal effect – for example, violent conflicts can lead 
to reduction in food production and poverty, or vice versa – often spreading across 
national borders into a wider region.30 Yet, such a potentially unlimited conception of 
human security has been criticised as being too ambiguous to be of any use for policy-
making31  in that ‘virtually any kind of unexpected or irregular discomfort could 
conceivably constitute a threat to one’s human security’.32  
 
In response to such criticism, a much narrower, minimalist conception of human 
security has emerged, placing human security squarely within the context of violence 
and conflict; such as the protection of civilians, women and children in armed 
conflict. 33  It was this narrow conception of human security which provided a 
theoretical foundation for the development of the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept 
and the associated debate on military intervention to protect civilian populations from 
mass atrocities.34 However, this narrow conception of human security has also been 
subjected to criticism for prioritising the values favoured by the Global North over 
those held in the Global South.35  
 
Third, unlike traditional, state-centred security which is often concerned with threats 
of armed attack, human security is to be achieved in a multidimensional and 
comprehensive manner. Thus, the Commission on Human Rights emphasises both 
protection and empowerment in an integrated approach to address a range of 
insecurities.36 It incorporates the idea of human development pioneered by Mahbub ul 
Haq, which has helped shift the focus of development issues from economic growth to 
the quality and richness of human lives.37 The idea of empowerment also closely 
relates to emancipation. As Ken Booth observes: 
 
‘Security’ means the absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of people (as 
individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them 
carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of 
those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. 
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Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or 
order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security.38 
 
Thus, progressive advocates consider that human security represents a transformation 
away from the traditional idea of security being provided by the sovereign state, to the 
protection and empowerment of the individual and the promotion of social progress 
through the merging of development and security.39 However, when translated into 
practice, human security tends to take the form of government foreign aid programs, 
as has been the case with Japan’s development aid,40 in particular the UN Trust Fund 
for Human Security they created.41  
 
Additionally, much narrower, but more distinct approaches to promoting human 
security have been considered. The ‘rights-based’ approach to human security, for 
example, attempts to explain that human rights underpin the normative and conceptual 
foundation of human security and serve as the means of ensuring human security.42 
Another perspective is the state-based approach, as represented by the ‘responsibility 
to protect’ concept, which seeks out ways in which sovereign states can address 
security threats to human beings, rather than threats to their own national security or 
their international relations.43 However, due to the controversies over its precise focus 
and scope, there is a risk of human security being misused or misguiding the debate 
when such familiar ideas and existing legal frameworks are relied upon as the means 
of addressing human security concerns (as will be discussed in Section 5-2 as the 
pathology of human security). At least one of the reasons why human security has 
been widely advocated and received into policy agendas worldwide is the very 
recognition that existing ideas and legal frameworks do not sufficiently address 
contemporary security threats from the viewpoint of human beings.44 Any discussion 
about the means to address human security issues must begin by critically assessing 
the adequacy of existing ideas and legal frameworks.   
 
Within the analytical framework of security, human security serves as a catalyst for 
expanding the horizon of contemporary security debates. The question relevant to this 
chapter is to what extent the idea of human security has or has not informed the 
development of international law, challenging its sovereignty-based structure. The 
remainder of this chapter examines this question in three different dimensions 
comprising the analytical framework of security, namely: (1) the focus (referent 
object) of security; (2) the scope of security issues; and (3) the means by which 
security threats are addressed.    
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3. Shifting the Focus 
 
Even though human security is first and foremost designed to shift the focus or 
referent object of security away from the state to the individual, the idea of a human-
centred approach itself is not alien to international law.45 International law, while 
being built upon the traditional, inter-state paradigm, has developed to accommodate 
a human-centred approach by incorporating, for example, the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination, the principle of respect for human dignity, and the principle of 
humanity. 46  These principles have underpinned the development of international 
human rights law, refugee law, and international humanitarian law; particularly in the 
second half of the twentieth century. If human security could only provide a shift 
towards a more human-centred approach, it would not offer much value to the 
development of international law. 
 
What distinguishes human security from the human-centric approach to international 
law, particularly international human rights law, is its place within the analytical 
framework of security. The human-centred approach to international law, as 
traditionally conceived, does not necessarily address the interests of human beings 
within the paradigm of security. Human security can even be considered a sub-set of 
the human-centred approach to international law, which has only recently evolved 
within the overall trend of expanding the concept of security in international policy 
discourses. Conceived as such, human security is inherently a public concept 
concerned with the security of individuals as members of the community, rather than 
each individual’s own personal security.47 The manifestation of the human-centred 
approach to international law in the paradigm of security, through the form of human 
security, has challenged the traditional conception of security as the sovereign 
prerogative of states.   
    
It is for this reason that the adoption of the 1997 Ottawa Treaty,48 the 1998 Rome 
Statute,49 and the 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 50  amongst the body of human rights treaties, has been seen as legal 
development motivated and facilitated by embracing and prioritising human security 
over national security. Security concerns of human beings have essentially pushed 
international standards of behaviour into the areas which were traditionally considered 
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domestic concerns of states. 51  Additionally, a more progressive view has been 
expressed, elevating the potential of human security into a norm that requires 
proportionality assessment under international humanitarian law to demonstrate that 
the legitimate military objective cannot be achieved by other means, rather than 
simply consider that civilian casualty is not excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated.52 According to this progressive view, human 
security is considered a normative, additional factor to be taken into account in 
balancing between military necessity and humanitarian concerns, whilst different 
from human rights-based approach in that it does not suggest an obligation to avoid or 
minimise any risk to civilians.53 Thus, human security plays a much broader function 
than human rights by contributing to the development and re-interpretation of legal 
rules, but is at the same time narrower than human rights in that it is concerned with 
the ‘security’ of human beings, their survival, livelihood and dignity.54    
 
Although the adoption of a new treaty or re-interpretation of existing legal rules may 
have been influenced and motivated by the idea of human security, whether this truly 
addresses human security concerns held by individuals is a different matter. States’ 
approach to human security issues may well be selective and deal only with what 
states consider to be a threat to human beings, rather than what individuals perceive to 
be a threat to themselves. Furthermore, human security issues may well be addressed 
only in the way that states consider appropriate, rather than the way in which 
individuals themselves require them to be addressed. Illustrative of this point are the 
issues of internal displacement and protracted refugee situation (where the displaced 
people are often encamped on border areas for a prolonged period of time), which 
illuminate the inadequacy of the state-oriented, monolithic understanding of ‘refugee 
protection’ without having regard to the dynamics and complexity of specific 
situations and individuals under the existing international refugee law. 55  There 
remains scope for revisiting even human-centred rules of international law so as to 
better accommodate the particular needs and circumstances of those who are suffering 
or perceiving threats.    
 
4. Expanding Security Agendas 
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Despite the conceptual debate concerning its scope as outlined above, there is no 
denying that human security has provided a theoretical foundation for expanding the 
range of security issues to be addressed, at least as policy agendas, including 
economic security, food security, health security and environmental security.56 The 
human security optic makes a significant contribution to how we consider the wider 
range of security issues in that it enables a consideration of the root causes of such 
issues – which are usually observed and felt at the local or regional level – from the 
perspective of those who are actually suffering or perceiving the threats, irrespective 
of their causal relationship with an armed conflict, which the state-centred notion of 
security has been primarily concerned about. Thus, human security is not simply a 
security multiplier, but demands the incorporation of ‘non-traditional’ security 
agendas, which pose challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples arising from 
non-military sources,57 as perceived by those who are suffering from the original 
causes, rather than as their consequences for armed conflict.      
 
However, accommodating ‘non-traditional’ security agendas from a human security 
perspective within the existing framework of international law is not straightforward. 
The basic premise of international law inevitably poses a structural obstacle to 
‘mainstreaming’ human security within the existing framework of international law.58 
International law is a system of law based on the consent of sovereign states and 
hence does not allow much scope for accommodating non-state entities and 
individuals as subjects of international law.59 This structural obstacle of international 
law inhibits the full potential of human security being harnessed to address ‘non-
traditional’ security issues. 
 
An example illustrating this problem is the issue of food security. The idea of food 
security has evolved over the last four decades from ‘food supply security’ focusing 
solely upon the availability of food supply as a security concern, 60  to a more 
comprehensive concept of ‘physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and 
nutritious food’.61 It is the concept of human security that arguably facilitated this 
shift, as the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report expressly provides that food 
security ‘requires not just enough food to go around… [but] requires that people have 
ready access to food – that they have an “entitlement” to food, by growing it for 
themselves, by buying it, or by taking advantage of a public food distribution 
system’.62 This statement was made ahead of the 1996 World Food Summit where 
states, for the first time, embraced this wider understanding of food security. 63 
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Nevertheless, the international trade rules,64 including those intended to address food 
security issues,65 have remained as the legal and structural barriers to the adoption of 
flexible food security policies by individual countries.66 This is also despite the fact 
that the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration acknowledged that a range of non-trade 
concerns such as food security should be taken into account.67 This ‘trade-centric’ 
approach to human security is also evident in the trade protection of intellectual 
properties, which has been criticised as denying traditional farmers’ accessibility of 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture.68    
 
The expansion of the security concept through the optic of human security has also 
influenced the mandate and activities of the UN Security Council, which appears to be 
the most appropriate forum to incorporate the trend, given that it has the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security within the UN 
system. Yet, it is a state-centric, military-oriented conception of security which 
underpins the UN collective security system, whose constitutive and legitimising aim 
has traditionally been the absence of armed aggression. 69  Mainstreaming human 
security to address non-traditional security issue within its framework requires 
transformation of its normative and institutional foundations into those that adopt 
human security as the driving force in the search for substantive legitimacy based on 
universal values.70  
 
As this author has discussed elsewhere, whilst the incorporation of a civilian 
protection mandate into peacekeeping operations has gone some way towards this 
direction, the prevailing view remains that non-traditional security issues such as 
health security, food security and climate change, are relevant to the UN Security 
Council only to the extent that those matters relate to conflicts.71 Thus, at least as it 
currently stands, the idea of human security has not been fully harnessed into 
collective security decision-making. It therefore remains to be seen whether and to 
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what extent the legal and political structure of the UN collective security system is 
capable of accommodating human security perspectives in dealing with both 
traditional and non-traditional security issues. The answer to this question may well 
depend on whether and how the multi-sectoral approach required to realise human 
security can be integrated into collective security actions, which forms the subject of 
the next section.    
 
5. Roles of Human Security in International Law 
 
5-1. Multidimensional Approach to Security 
 
The concept of human security functions as a goal as much as the means to achieve 
the goal. As the 1994 Human Development Report sets out, it promotes not only the 
‘protection’ of human beings but also the ‘empowerment’ of people to develop their 
potential, through concerted efforts to develop norms, processes and institutions that 
systematically address insecurities. The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in his 
2010 Human Rights Report also considers that the concept of human security 
introduces a practical framework for identifying specific insecurities as well as for 
considering the institutional and governance arrangements that are needed to ensure 
the survival, livelihood and dignity of individuals and communities in a 
multidimensional and comprehensive manner.72 Conceived as such, the role of human 
security as a security multiplier also extends the means by which security threats are 
to be addressed.  
 
Nevertheless, the prevalent position among states remains that human security is to be 
achieved within the existing framework of international law and therefore does not 
entail new legal obligations for states, effectively rejecting any shift away from the 
traditional idea of security being provided by the sovereign state. 73  Within the 
European Union, it is considered that ‘[r]espect for all human rights and the rule of 
law should remain at the core of any application of the human security approach’.74 
Although the concept of human security itself may not create any new legal 
obligations, it does not mean that human security is devoid of any legal and normative 
values. Indeed, as the Australian delegation to the UN General Assembly observed, 
human security provides a ‘normative framework’ to ensure that our collective actions 
are not fragmented and that they directly benefit affected populations.75  
 
It is in this normative context that mainstreaming human security can make a 
contribution in developing or re-conceptualising rules of international law. As 
examined above, human security has motivated and influenced the adoption of new 
treaties, so far mainly in the area of arms control,76 which could and should expand 
into other areas such as the international trade law regime.77 The notion of human 
security could also allow international and regional courts and tribunals to expand 
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their approach to security. Judge Koroma, for example, in considering the request for 
the indication of provisional measures in Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo, held in his Declaration that the Court’s role in maintaining international peace 
and security includes the promotion and protection of human security and the right to 
life, having regard to the real and serious threats that existed to the population of the 
region concerned. 78  In the Kosovo advisory opinion, Judge Trindade relied upon 
human security in observing that states have the ‘duty to protect and to empower their 
inhabitants’ (emphasis original).79  
 
Such a positive obligation upon states has been recognised in the context of the right 
to security through international, regional and domestic human rights jurisprudence.80  
A reading of human security into the positive obligation of states to protect their 
inhabitants from violence and to empower, however, raises concern for the tension 
between liberty as an individual right and security (including human security) as a 
public or collective interest.81 Should human security be incorporated into the right to 
security so as to re-conceptualise or expand the right, the question inevitably arises as 
to how the potential conflict between the right to security (for example, of the public 
from terrorist threats) and other human rights such as the right to liberty and fair trial 
(for example, of suspected terrorists) should be reconciled.82 Some may argue that the 
right to security is superior to other human rights,83 whereas others consider that the 
right to security should be narrowly confined to avoid such conflict.84 Indeed, as will 
be discussed below, a certain application of a human security perspective leads to a 
pathological debate on the use of human security as a justification for controversial 
measures within the existing legal framework.         
 
5-2. Pathology of Human Security 
 
While human security is, as argued above, essentially a public concept concerned with 
the security of individuals as members of the community, rather than each 
individual’s own personal security, too much emphasis on the collective as opposed to 
each individual blurs the line between human security and national security. In a 
twisted sense, human security can be conceived of as a necessary precondition to the 
society in which human rights can be exercised, and thus justify derogation from the 
human rights of certain individuals. This is the line of argument that the former 
Canadian Attorney-General Irwin Cotler adopted in assessing the human rights 
compatibility of controversial counter-terrorism legislation by describing it as 
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‘“human security” legislation that purports to protect both national security and civil 
liberties’.85 
 
A similar position was adopted by the former Australian Attorney-General Philip 
Ruddock in his theoretical, human security-based rationale for Australia’s 
controversial counter-terrorism legislation. According to Ruddock:  
 
Human security is a broad concept focused on the individual or community, rather than 
the state. Human security rests upon security for the individual citizen, which requires 
not only the absence of violent conflict, but also respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms…  
 
While it is accepted that any tightening of security arrangemnets will impact on certain 
rights, a more useful debate is to consider whether tightening security arrangements is 
in the interests of protecting fundamental human rights as a whole.86 
 
This argument was advanced in justifying controversial counter-terrorism legislation 
that derogates from fundamental rights and freedoms in the process on the grounds 
that ultimately it promotes human security by preserving a society in which rights and 
freedoms can be exercised. What we see in this line of argument is reliance on the 
normative goal of human security as a way of shifting the balance between national 
security and individual human rights without explaining why the shift is towards the 
reduction of human rights (not the other way) or to what extent it can be shifted.87 The 
notion of human security is only given a limited consideration as a normative goal, 
without being projected into the third analytical security dimension concerning the 
means by which security threats are to be addressed. Human security is not a language 
of oppression, but rather one of empowerment and emancipation.  
 
Another area that illustrates the potential pathological use of human security concerns 
the debate on humanitarian intervention. In particular, early literature on human 
security considers human security to be ‘interventionist by nature’ encompassing the 
use of force for more cosmopolitan goals.88 This, again, reflects the pitfall of a limited 
understanding of human security as only a ‘normative goal’ and the failure to harness 
its potential in full as the ‘means’ to address security threats. It would be too much to 
expect the human security approach to have positive impacts on the future debate 
about humanitarian intervention, given the inherent dilemma posed by competing 
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norms and moral imperatives, which cannot simply be resolved by embracing human 
security as a substitute for national security.89 
 
Irrespective of the true intention behind the notion of human security, lingering 
concerns over the concept have been associated with suspicion that it might be used to 
justify unwarranted intervention in vulnerable countries for political reasons without 
having regard to the real needs and priorities of their peoples and even perhaps at the 
expense of their social and political stability.90 Policy-makers in Southeast Asia, for 
example, have been wary of the ‘freedom from fear’ aspect of human security, due to 
their apprehension that it may justify external intervention in their internal situations 
which often involve violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.91 
The UN Secretary-General’s follow-up report on human security and the following 
debate in the UN General Assembly in 2012 hit the nail on the coffin for the idea of 
linking human security with military intervention. This emphasised a common 
understanding that human security does not entail the threat or use of force and is 
implemented with full respect for the purposes and principles of the UN Charter 
including the full respect for state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention.92 
Moreoever, human security is now clearly distinguished and even dissociated from its 
sibling, the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine, 93  presumably due to the political 
stigma attached to the latter in the aftermath of the NATO’s intervention in Libya in 
March 2011 in the implementation of the doctrine under Security Council Resolution 
1973.94     
 
Nevertheless, concern for the misuse or abuse of human security for political interests 
of powerful states remains strong. Indeed, the persistent call for reaching an 
agreement on the definition of human security, expressed by a few states during the 
UN General Assembly debate on human security in 2012, appears to stem from the 
fear that a vaguely framed concept could potentially be misused. 95  However, as 
examined above, it is the limited understanding of human security, rather than the 
ambiguity of the concept itself, that invites the misuse or abuse of the concept. 
Harnessing the full potential of human security, rather than seeking to define it in 




Notwithstanding (or thanks to) its amorphous nature, human security functions as a 
security multiplier in all three dimensions of the analytical framework of security. It 
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provides a normative and practical framework to ensure that concerted efforts to 
develop norms, processes and institutions systematically address insecurities from the 
perspective of those who are actually suffering or perceiving the threats. However, 
this chapter has demonstrated that its limited normative impact so far has been due to 
the restricted application of the notion, as much as the legal and structural obstacles 
within the existing framework of international law. Thus, the idea of human security 
challenges international law not only in respect of its sovereignty-based legal 
framework but more significantly in relation to the very notion of security shared by 
policy-makers and jurists. 
 
By embracing and promoting the notion of human security to its full potential, 
existing obligations such as those towards refugees, internally displaced people and 
those who are in protracted refugee situations can be revisited in order to facilitate a 
more appropriate implementation that accommodates their perspective.96 It may also 
promote the adoption of new treaties, amendment or re-interpretation of existing 
treaty obligations in a broader range of areas such as food security, health security and 
climate change. The potential of human security’s normative effects is yet to be fully 
harnessed. Therefore, it remains to be seen to what extent mainstreaming human 
security will actually challenge the sovereignty-based framework of international law 
and to what extent the legal and political structure of the UN collective security 
system is capable of accommodating human security perspectives in dealing with both 
traditional and non-traditional security issues. 
 
Embracing and harnessing the full potential of human security is also important in 
order to prevent a misuse or abuse of the notion for promoting or attempting to justify 
traditional, oppressive means to achieve security under the guise of ‘human security’. 
A practical framework provided by human security broadens the way in which we 
consider and address security issues – not simply through a rights-based approach or 
development aid, but also more importantly by recognising and promoting its 
contribution to new legal development and new jurisprudence. The normative and 
practical impacts of human security on the development of international law thus 
depend on the extent to which states, policy-makers and jurists are prepared to move 
beyond the definitional debate and embrace its perspective and philosophy of 
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